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Abstract 
 
Shibboleth is an open source implementation of the OASIS standard Security 
Assertion Markup Language (SAML). Shibboleth Access Management 
Federations (AMFs) are used daily around the globe by millions of users – mainly 
in the academic realm – in order to securely exchange the identity information 
necessary to make authorisation decisions concerning protected web resources. 
AMFs are typically comprised of a number of entities, eg, organisations working 
together to achieve a set of shared objectives while each member retains control 
over its own internal affairs. There are three main categories of entities: identity 
management is devolved to individual member organisations who act as Identity 
Providers, Service Providers are established by organisations wanting to make 
protected resources available, and finally, there is a small Coordinating Centre. 
Principally through the European Spatial Data Infrastructure Network (ESDIN) 
project and the OGC Web Service (OWS) Shibboleth Interoperability Experiment, 
it has been established that Shibboleth provides a production strength, standards 
based, open source, interoperable mainstream IT solution to the problem of how 
to implement AMFs around the OWS central to SDI’s. Furthermore, it has been 
demonstrated using a prototype federation of INSPIRE compliant services 
established under ESDIN that this can be done without modifications to either 
mainstream Shibboleth or OWS. However, non browser based clients require 
adaptation. Various options exist as to how the main actors within a European 
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SDI/Federation may organise themselves in order to realise the objective of 
allowing authorised users from key organisations, eg, EU bodies concerned with 
environmental policy formation, seamless access to harmonised protected 
geospatial information through OWS. This paper proposes that a parallel security 
infrastructure is necessary to realise SDI where protected resources are involved 
and gives an account of work undertaken demonstrating how Shibboleth based 
AMF’s meet this need.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Security is an important topic in the development of Spatial Data Infrastructures 
(SDI) that is often neglected or misunderstood and which often ends up 
presenting an insurmountable barrier preventing SDI initiatives from meeting their 
initial ambition. For a wide variety of different reasons; commercial, national 
security, data protection/privacy, etc, much valuable data is protected, and while 
the “open agenda” has enjoyed huge success and grown significantly over the 
past few years, the reality is that a significant amount of the most valuable data is 
going to stay protected. 
If this statement is acknowledged as true and we want SDI to reach their full 
potential and make accessible the widest possible range (open and protected) of 
data, services and other resources, then a genuinely interoperable solution to the 
problem of how to share protected resources across administrative domains 
needs to be found. 
As with INSPIRE and its provision that it “…shall build upon infrastructures for 
spatial information established and operated by the Member States.”, (European 
Parliament and Council, 2007), it should be a guiding principal that any potential 
solution – besides addressing all relevant security concerns - should have 
minimal impact on existing operational systems. 
2. SCOPE AND LICENCING 
This paper does not cover to any significant extent the related issues of 
geospatial rights management, e-commerce, licencing, licence negotiation, 
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licence enforcement or authorisation. We are concerned primarily here with the 
fundamental issues of access control and authentication. 
Our starting point is: wherever it is necessary to control access to online 
resources for whatever reason, it is a fundamental pre-requisite that you be able 
to identify who (or what) is trying to access your protected resource. Everything 
else is predicated on this ability. 
To make the problem tractable and provide meaningful demonstrations we limit 
the discussion to situations where “framework agreements” are in operation. In 
the language of INSPIRE, “framework agreement”, may be defined as “an 
arrangement that includes two or more partners and covers the conditions for 
access and use of one or more data sets and services established prior to use”1 
Framework agreements are widespread. Examples in the UK public sector 
include the One Scotland Mapping Agreement2 and the recently launched (April 
2011) Public Sector Mapping Agreement for England and Wales3. Within the UK 
academic sector, the Ordnance Survey (the UK’s National Mapping Agency) 
EDINA Digimap licencing arrangement is a typical framework agreement in 
respect of how many of the most significant geospatial datasets are made 
available to the academic sector.  
The relationships involved in establishing and operating Framework Agreements 
can be complicated. In the context of this paper though, the key points are that 
end users need know nothing about this complexity - the service is free at the 
point of use. However, the end users do need to identify themselves so that 
technically the relationships can be verified. 
For the purposes of this report, the real world use cases most obviously catered 
for are where framework agreements are in operation; where licences are 
negotiated “out of band”, access restrictions are indicated in service and dataset 
metadata, and content is free at the point of use for authenticated and authorised 
users. 
Note though, that in maintaining this “separation of concerns”, that the other 
aspects of security mentioned above (geospatial rights management, e-
                                                
1 http://inspire-forum.jrc.ec.europa.eu/pg/pages/view/26345/framework-agreements [accessed May 
2011] 
2 http://www.ordnancesurvey.co.uk/oswebsite/public-sector/scotland/index.html [accessed May 
2011] 
3 http://www.ordnancesurvey.co.uk/oswebsite/public-sector/mapping-agreement/index.html 
[accessed May 2011] 
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commerce, licencing, licence negotiation, licence enforcement, authorisation) 
may be added on in a modular fashion to the fundamental work described here.  
It is a premise of this paper that if broad agreement can be reached on a 
standards based interoperable solution to access control then it will facilitate 
making progress with addressing other important outstanding interoperability 
questions relating to sharing of data in SDI. 
3. AUTHENTICATION 
Authentication is a mandatory part of access control and is concerned with 
establishing that claims made concerning a subject who is attempting to use a 
particular resource are authentic, ie, true. Typically, this involves confirming a 
subjects identity. This kind of information is essential before it can be determined 
that the subject is authorised to access the resource. 
SDI is underpinned by open geospatial interoperability standards from primarily 
the Open Geospatial Consortium (OGC) and ISO TC/211. The key OGC 
interfaces (we concentrated on Web Map Service (WMS) and Web Feature 
Service (WFS)) are agnostic about how they may be secured and it is left to the 
discretion of implementers and individual circumstances. The result is that there 
is a proliferation of point solutions with no widely accepted dejure or defacto 
standards. Consequently, there is little genuine cross administrative domain 
interoperability in SDIs where protected resoures are concerned.  
As the directive allows public access to be limited, INSPIRE is very much a case 
in point. Across the European member states, we currently have the situation 
where public authorities are publishing services but controlling access to many 
(often the most valuable data) using a range of different, incompatible, unrelated 
techniques.  
We would contend that, in order to claim to be a genuinely interoperable solution 
to the problem of cross adminstrative access control around OGC Web Services, 
any widely adopted solution should have the characteristics identified in table 1. 
The rest of this paper is primarily concerned with investigating whether Access 
Management Federations based on Security Assertion Markup Language 
(SAML) meet these requirements. Specifically, we examine whether Shibboleth4 
(an open source implementation of SAML) meets the needs of the those 
elements of the geospatial community who agree that a complementary security 
                                                
4 http://shibboleth.internet2.edu/ [accessed Jan 2012] 
International Journal of Spatial Data Infrastructures Research, 2012, Vol.7, 107-124. 
 111 
infrastructure is necessary to enable SDI involving protected resources to meet 
their full potential. 
Table 1: Twelve Desirable Attributes for a Solution to Securing SDI 
1 based on open security interoperability standards 
2 works across administrative domains 
3 Single Sign On (SSO) implementation, ie, principles authenticate at one web 
site, access the resource of interest, and are then able to access additional 
protected resources at other web sites without having to re-authenticate 
4 does not require any changes to the OGC interfaces being protected 
5 requires minimal changes to OGC web service clients 
6 proven production strength 
7 satisfies data privacy requirements 
8 flexible in order to accommodate a wide variety of different use cases 
9 should be an open source “reference implementation” 
10 not geospatial specific and in widespread mainstream IT use 
11 should, in so far as is possible, be built on information systems already in 
place 
12 should not be centralised 
 
4. SECURITY ASSERTION MARKUP LANGUAGE (SAML) 
SAML is an open standard of the OASIS Security Services Technical Committee, 
whose primary purpose is to enable authentication data across security and 
policy domains by defining the means for a secure exchange of Extensible 
Markup Language (XML) encoded assertions.  
The main use case for SAML is Single Sign On (SSO): where users authenticate 
at one web site, access the resource of interest if they are authorised, and are 
then able to access additional protected resources at other web sites participating 
in the same SSO network without having to authenticate again. SAML enables 
the secure communication of authentication information from the first site to 
additional sites in different security/administrative domains, these sites can then 
decide whether the user is authorised to access the protected resource or not. 
An organisational pre-requisite for this kind of SAML scenario is the existence of 
an access management federation (alternatively called identity management 
federations). In this instance, federation is taken to mean a group of 
organisations with common business goals which has established a circle of trust 
and formal understanding with associated procedures so that these cross-domain 
business interactions can take place. Note that depending upon factors such as 
scale, eg, national or international, number of organisations, degree of similarity, 
etc, establishing these arrangements can be a non-trivial undertaking. 
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Most organisations with valuable online resources have some form of identity 
management in place, the decoupling and abstraction of identity management in 
federations required to make these cross security domain decisions is 
standardised in SAML. In Figure 1; the Service Provider (SP) role is assumed by 
organisations that want to make protected resources available and the role of 
Identity Provider (IdP) is assigned to organisations which want to manage their 
own user credentials and have their users participate to be able to access the 
protected resources provided by the SPs.  
Figure 1: Key Roles within a Typical SAML Access Management Federation5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A key aspect is formal agreement on what security and identity information 
concerning the agent who is accessing the protected resource is required to 
enable decisions to be taken as to whether they are authorised to access the 
resource or not - this information is communicated as assertions.  
Figure 2 provides some fundamental information on the basic concepts of SAML 
and serves to illustrate some of the flexibility of SAML as these basic concepts 
can be combined in various ways to meet the requirements of multiple use cases. 
                                                
5 Adapted from a diagram on the Switch (Serving Swiss Universities) website: 
http://www.switch.ch/aai/about/federation/ [accessed May 2011] 
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• Assertions are basic packets of information containing statements about 
a principal (which wants to access the protected resource) that an 
asserting party, ie, an IdP, claims to be true. The SP then uses this 
information to make access control decisions. This attribute based model 
gives great flexibility, eg, under circumstances where the principals full 
identity is not important, cannot be shared for data privacy reasons, or is 
insufficient for an authorisation decision without additional information. 
• Protocols describe how packaged assertions are exchanged with SAML 
request and response elements, and gives the processing rules that 
SAML entities must follow when producing or consuming these elements. 
• Bindings are mappings of SAML protocol message onto standard 
messaging formats and/or communications protocols, eg, Hypertext 
Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS). 
• Profiles describe in detail how SAML assertions, protocols, and bindings 
are used together to support a defined use case. In the context of this 
paper, two profiles are of immediate interest: the Web Browser SSO 
Profile and Enhanced Client or Proxy (ECP) Profile. 
Figure 2: Basic SAML Concepts 
 
Source: OASIS, 2008 
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5. SHIBBOLETH 
Shibboleth is an initiative from the US based Internet2 research and education 
networking consortium used primarily in the academic sector. It is an open source 
package that allows the establishment of federations and may be considered as 
a “reference implementation” for SAML. It is a production strength solution to the 
problem of how to securely exchange user information based on open standards. 
Shibboleth is being used daily by millions of users, eg, 8 million in the UK 
federation alone, around the globe and there are Shibboleth based access 
management federations in most developed countries, including most of Europe.  
Table 2: Examples of Worldwide Shibboleth Federations6 
 
As indicated in the text above, in the belief that enterprises themselves are best 
positioned to manage the identities of their members, the philosophy behind 
Shibboleth/SAML is to devolve responsibility as much as possible. Note the 
arrangement represented in Figure 1 is simplified and that other configurations 
are possible, eg, one large institution may setup an IdP and run it on behalf of 
several smaller institutions as well as itself.  
There are still some components that must be centralised and under the control 
of the Coordinating Centre. Using the example of the UK Access Management 
Federation, these functions include:  
                                                
6 Deutsches Forschungsnetz (DFN): https://www.aai.dfn.de/links/ [accessed May 2011] 
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• running the main WAYF (Where Are You From) or DS (Discovery 
Service), effectively a list mapping institution names to IdP Uniform 
Resource Locators (URLs).  
• maintaining and publishing the federation metadata describing 
participating entities. This provides the information required for entities to 
know how to communicate with each other, and establishes a trust fabric 
permitting entities to verify each other’s identities 
• user support, eg, for software upgrades 
• enacting and informing federation policy, eg, for attribute release from the 
IdP’s, attribute request from the SP’s 
• procedures for joining and leaving the federation 
Note that PKI trust fabric is used by many Shibboleth federations including the 
UK AMF. A full treatment of the different models which can be used is beyond the 
scope of this paper. The reader is referred to (Young, 2010) for a statement of 
the current position in the UK. 
6. SHIBBOLETH RELATED OGC INTEROPERABILITY EXPERIMENTS 
OGC Interoperability Experiments (IE) are intended as relatively simple, low 
overhead, means for OGC members to get together and, facilitated by OGC staff, 
advance specific technical objectives within the OGC baseline. They are more 
lightweight than the OGC Web Services initiatives and are intended to be 
focussed on specific interoperability issues. All effort is viewed as voluntary and 
supported by in-kind contributions by participating member organisations. The 
duration is normally of the order of 6 months or so as identified in the IEs activity 
plan. There have been two Shibboleth related IE’s in the last two years. 
6.1. Authentication IE 
Partly as a consequence of work undertaken in the JISC7 funded Secure Access 
to Geospatial Services (SEE-GEO) project demonstrating how Web Map 
Services (WMS) can be protected using Shibboleth, and partly in recognition that 
an approach to authentication acceptable to the open geospatial standards 
community is both important and missing, the OGC Security Working Group 
initiated discussion on an Authentication Interoperability Experiment. The formal 
kickoff was held in association with the Mountain View Technical Committee (TC) 
meeting in Sept 2009.  
The aim of the Authentication Interoperability Experiment was to test standard 
ways of transferring authentication information between OGC clients and OGC 
services by leveraging mechanisms already existing in the transport protocol 
                                                
7 http://www.jisc.ac.uk/ [accessed Jan 2012] 
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(HTTP and SOAP). The original idea was to test the following mechanisms: 
HTTP Authentication, HTTP Cookies, SSL/X509, SAML, Shibboleth, OpenID and 
WS-Security.  
The main output from this activity was an Engineering Report (OGC, 2011) 
approved by the OGC in Dec 2010.  
At the time this IE was initiated, the EU-funded, Eurogeographics led, European 
Spatial Data Infrastructure Network (ESDIN8) project was underway. With the 
agreement and support of the ESDIN consortium (Higgins, 2011), EDINA 
participated in this IE and concentrated on testing SAML2 based SSO 
authentication for a small federation (the ESDIN Federation) of protected OGC 
Web Services (OWS).  
The main outcomes from the ESDIN participation in this experiment were: 
• Further evidence that it is possible to protect WMS using Shibboleth 
• No changes to the standard OGC interface. Their is no need to use SOAP 
(though note there is no reason why Shibboleth would not work with 
SOAP were it required) 
• No changes to the standard Shibboleth download 
• Changes are required to the OWS desktop clients.  
In the course of this IE, EDINA developed and demonstrated two clients: one 
desktop (based on OpenJump9) implementing the SAML Enhanced Client or 
Proxy (ECP) Profile (OASIS, 2005) and one browser based (OpenLayers10) 
implementing the SAML Web Browser SSO Profile. 
6.2. OWS Shibboleth IE 
Throughout the ESDIN project, as part of broader awareness and dissemination 
activities, it was policy to engage with a wide variety of stakeholders to 
encourage discussion and ideas from a wide variety of organisations and 
individuals as to how to take the project forward. In one such discussion, it was 
suggested by a representative from a GIS vendor that a good way of 
encouraging the software producing members of the OGC to modify their client 
software to be able to undergo the Shibboleth/SAML interactions was to hold an 
event where a variety of software producers publicly demonstrated their software 
working with the ESDIN federation. 
                                                
8 http://www.esdin.eu/ [accessed May 2011] 
9 http://www.openjump.org/ [accessed Jan 2012] 
10 http://openlayers.org/ [accessed Jan 2012] 
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After discussion with the OGC it was decide to cast this “plugfest” or “Technology 
Integration” type event as an IE. A press release inviting participation in the OGC 
Web Service Shibboleth Interoperability Experiment (OSI) was issued on the 31st 
Aug 2010 with the first meeting taking place during the Toulouse TC in 
September 2010.  
The stated aim in OSI was to provide the OGC software producing community 
with the means and opportunity of modifying their OWS client software to be able 
to work with Shibboleth Access Management Federations. The emphasis was on 
desktop clients as this is harder than browser based clients and having a range of 
different proprietary and open source client types demonstrated is more valuable. 
We would then provide the participants with the opportunity to demonstrate their 
software in action by granting temporary access to the ESDIN federation and 
Secure Dimensions GmbH. 
To achieve the above; EDINA managed the IE, provided an open source 
reference implementation of a modified desktop client (the Open Jump client), 
provided technical support and organised the Technology Integration Experiment 
event as a webinar. 
The webinar took place on the afternoon of Thurs 18th Nov, 2010. Approximately 
30 people attended and the following organisations all demonstrated modified 
OWS clients accessing ESDIN federation protected services: EDINA, Snowflake, 
Cadcorp, Envitia, con terra and the EU’s Joint Research Centre.  
At the end of the webinar, we had demonstrated different clients (desktop, 
browser, proxy), different services (WMS and Web Feature Service (WFS)), and 
different federations: ESDIN and a test federation established by the BKG (the 
German National Mapping Agency). A draft OGC Engineering Report has been 
produced with the final report due for publication in 2012. 
7. SHIBBOLETH FOR SECURING SDI 
Probably the most significant outcome from the above activity is that we have 
demonstrated that technically, Shibboleth can be used to provide a production 
strength solution to securing SDI. By production strength, we mean a standards 
based solution that demonstrably works using technology that is currently in 
operation and being used by large numbers of organisations and people in many 
different countries (see table 2). 
On the server side, it is technically straightforward to install and configure 
Shibboleth to protect unprotected, unmodified OWS established using any OGC 
standards compliant software. On the client side, modifications are necessary but 
doable. Experience with a range of different clients shows that browser based 
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clients are easy and desktop based clients harder. The software producing 
participants in the OWS Shibboleth IE modified their clients in weeks, not months, 
and several are making their offerings commercially available. If the decision is 
taken to operationalise this approach, then it is reasonable to expect that support 
and tooling from the GI community will be forthcoming. 
Figure 3 builds on Figure 1, it illustrates how in the kind of pan-European 
scenarios that ESDIN was concerned with that the Service Providers are 
INSPIRE points of contact (often National Mapping and Cadastral Agencies 
(NMCAs)) and that the services being provided can be either WMS or WFS 
services. 
Figure 3: A Possible Evolution for the ESDIN Federation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Higgins, 2011 
There are a number of different ways the different roles within the federation can 
be filled. For example, each organisation can become an Identity Provider (IdP) 
itself, or a larger organisation can fulfill this role on behalf of several smaller 
organisations.  
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In an INSPIRE context, it is likely that there will be more than one public authority 
within each member state standing up protected services. This leads to several 
(non-exclusive) options: 
1. One federation and every legally mandated organisation joins.  
2. Multiple federations: one in each country and one pan-European.  
3. One federation: one organisation in each country, the INSPIRE point of 
contact joins the single pan-European federation and acts as the gateway for 
all the other legally mandated organisations in the country that are standing 
up INSPIRE services. 
Option 1: Unlikely as not every public authority in every country is going to have 
the capacity. Even within the ESDIN project, with resourcing and expert technical 
support to hand, it proved difficult to persuade NMCAs to join. 
Option 2: Possible in some cases, eg, where the members states own national 
e-government interoperability framework mandates the use of SAML for 
transferring identity information. On the other hand, it is difficult to see this 
happening where member states already have major commitment and 
investment in alternative means of identity management, eg, the UK’s 
Government Gateway .  
Option 3: May be the most practical intermediate step.  
7.1. Shibboleth and the Academic Sector 
Shibboleth is used primarily in the academic sector and one consequence of its 
wider uptake by the geospatial community which should not be underestimated 
would be the potential for improved interoperability bertween the public and 
academic sectors.  
Evidence (Medyckyj-Scott et al, 2011) suggests that the academic sector often 
gets neglected when SDI’s are being planned and developed. A consequence of 
this is that graduates are often ill equipped with the skills necessary to enable full 
exploitation of interoperable SDI technology, neither are they familiar with using 
reference data from public authorities, and the public sector finds that its research 
and development requirements are not adequately addressed 
There is an active open source community around Shibboleth and a pool of 
expertise in its use and administration within the academic sector. It is in the 
geospatial communities interest to leverage this capacity and maintain links with 
existing national federations. The technology we use for securing SDI should be 
mainstream and care should be taken that we do not go down a geospatial 
specific path so that we can leverage broader developments. In the case of 
Shibboleth/SAML, a good current example would be inter-federation 
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interoperability - an active area of research and development within the internet 
security community. 
8. RELATED WORK – OPENID 
Shibboleth/SAML is not the only technical option for access management 
federations and OpenID is emerging in the geospatial community as a serious 
alternative with current examples to be found within the Earth Systems Grid, eg, 
Siebenlist et al, 2009, and the Global Earth Observation System of Systems 
(GEOSS) communities, eg, GEOSS, 2011  
In this respect, it may be worth considering some of the findings from the JISC 
funded Review of OpenID (Chadwick, 2008), see Table 3 below. 
Table 3. Comparison of Features of OpenID and Shibboleth as implemented in the 
UK Federation (adapted from Chadwick, 2008) 
Feature OpenID Shibboleth/UK 
Federation 
Ease of understanding/ 
simplicity of specifications 
Simple Complex 
Implementation effort  Relatively Low Relatively High 
WAYF service  Not needed Needed 
User Registration  Zero assurance of who the 
user is 
Almost always linked to a 
real person 
Trust Infrastructure  None specified  IdPs can state they can 
always identify the real life 
person 
Re-allocation of IDs Yes, can be done Yes, can be done, but not 
designed to be life-long 
Privacy Protection None. IdP and SP can track 
users between sessions 
(except that users can be 
anyone and can change 
their OpenIDs frequently). 
SP cannot track user 
between sessions, but IdP 
can track which SPs user is 
interacting with 
Phishing Very susceptible Very susceptible unless 
users scrutinize X.509 
certificates carefully. 
Cross Site Request Forgery Very susceptible Not susceptible 
Dependency on IdP for 
24x24 service 
Yes Yes 
Few high-value SPs Yes No 
 
In the authors opinion, it is not proven that OpenID meets the attributes itemised 
in table 1 and it is unlikely that the technology is sufficiently secure to persuade a 
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majority of content providers to expose their most valuable holdings available 
over the internet to users authenticated this way. 
9. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
As SDI implementations progress it is the authors opinion that it will increasingly 
become clear that a concomitant security infrastructure that operates across 
administrative domains is necessary in order to make SDI viable where protected 
resources are involved.  
The current debate in respect of OpenID and Shibboleth/SAML is a good 
example of what makes security difficult. It is a complex issue and it is difficult to 
understand important issues without being deeply involved with the internet 
security community. One of the main differences relates to privacy (with openID 
there is no assurance of who the user is) with all the attendant policy issues 
associated with managing online user identity information. 
As Figure 4 illustrates, the situation becomes an order of magnitude harder when 
the considerable legal, political and organisational aspects are taken into 
consideration, not to mention the financial implications.  
To progress this work, possibly the best course is to begin by clearly 
acknowledging that, unless SDI ambitions are scaled back, or its made a pre-
requisite that all resources are open, then a complementary cross-administrative 
domain security infrastructure is required with associated research and 
development programme. 
Table 1 provides a starting point based on what we think the characteristics of 
such a security infrastructure should be. It is our opinion, that there is a need for 
a thorough engagement with the main SDI content providers to discover what it 
would take to persuade them to make their most valuable resources, eg, 
protected data and services, available online across administrative domains. One 
view onto the results from such a study could be a set of transverse use cases 
that could be mapped to SDI governance procedures. 
The Shibboleth/SAML solution presented above demonstrably works, it meets 
the requirements articulated in table 1, engages the academic sector, and is 
designed from the ground up to integrate with existing identity management 
systems. However, as indicated in Figure 4, technical interoperability may very 
well turn out to have been the easy bit. 
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Figure 4: Dimensions of Interoperability 
 
Source: IDABC, 2008 
We conclude this paper with a summary of what we consider some of the 
priorities for future related work. 
9.1. Future Work 
• Service Chaining: In terms of architecture patterns for service chaining (ISO, 
2003), the solution presented above only works for “transparent” chaining, ie, 
where the user knows the details of the services being invoked. Where 
protected services are involved in association with the more advanced 
chaining patterns, ie, “translucent” and “opaque” chaining; where the user 
invokes a service that in turns invokes a number of other services, it could be 
necessary to have a means of authenticating users for services other than the 
one initially invoked.  
• Inter-federation interoperability: It is already the case that individuals may 
belong to more than one federation and it is likely that as federated 
approaches expand this will become more common. Numerous scenarios 
may also be envisaged where for some purposes a user, eg, working with a 
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cross-border pan-European application, needs to access national data. In 
accordance with the organisational model outlined in Figure 3, this resolves to 
a problem of interoperability between a pan-European federation and 
national, sub-national or thematic federations. 
• Interoperability with OpenID: As identified in Chadwick, 2008, and 
elsewhere within the Shibboleth and OpenID communities, there is no 
technical reason why both protocols cannot be used within the same or 
different federations. It is up to the service providers to decide who or what 
they trust. 
• Interoperability with other uses of SAML: The perceived complexity of 
SAML is one of its strengths as well as one of its weaknesses. It allows for 
great flexibility enabling a wide variety of use cases. For example, various 
profiles may be supported and individual SAML components may be used in 
isolation. A consequence of this is that SAML is already widely used both in 
mainstream IT and within the geospatial community, eg, OGC, 2010. 
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